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BANK DIRECTORS' DUTIES UNDER THE
COMMON LAW OF ARKANSAS
D. Franklin Arey, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
Concern over the health of depository institutions' has mounted
over the past decade. Savings and loan institutions and their
problems have received the most attention, perhaps justifiably: esti-
mates of the cost to resolve the problems at the approximately 340
insolvent savings and loans operating at the end of 19882 range from
$85 billion3 to $100 billion.4 While not as well publicized, banks are
also experiencing capitalization problems: there were 221 bank fail-
* B.A., Hendrix College, 1984; J.D. with honors, University of Arkansas at Little Rock
School of Law, 1988; associate with the firm of Eichenbaum, Scott, Miller, Liles, & Heister,
P.A., Little Rock, Arkansas.
The author would like to thank Edward M. Penick, James W. Cherry, and Prof. Frances
Fendler for their helpful comments, and Marcia Diaz and Karen Garrick for their assistance
'in preparing this article. The mistakes are, of course, the author's.
1. This generic term applies to a class of institutions such as commercial banks, savings
and loans, savings banks, and credit unions. For further explanation of the term, and a discus-
sion of the elements of the class it represents, see 1 M. MALLOY, THE CORPORATE LAW OF
BANKS, §§ 1.1-1.2 (1988).
2. U.S. GEN'L ACCT. OFFICE, RESOLVING THE SAVINGS & LOAN CRISIS 2 (Jan. 26,
1989) (document GAO/T-GGD-89-3) (statement of Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States, before the Committee on the Budget of the United States House of
Representatives) [hereinafter Bowsher].
3. Id.
4. Moore, The Bust of '89, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 23, 1989, at 36.
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ures in 1988, a post-Depression record. 5
Many of the savings and loan failures are now being linked to
fraud and other mismanagement on the part of owners, directors, and
officers.6 Whatever the cause, regulatory actions brought by federal
regulators against directors and officers of banks and savings and
loans are on the rise.7
With this increased attention to the duties of directors in mind,
this article examines the common law duties owed by directors of
banks8 in Arkansas. While this article focuses on Arkansas common
law, one should keep in mind that federal statutes9 and federal com-
mon law10 circumscribe the duties of bank directors to a very large
degree. State statutes also impose duties on directors of state banks. 1
Where these sources of law do not supply needed rules, though,
courts utilize state common law to ascertain directors' duties.' 2 By
reviewing the cases, this article will set forth some of the common law
5. Arkansas Gazette, March 15, 1989, at C3; see also Bowsher, supra note 2, at 7 (noting
a recent growth in the number of inadequately capitalized banking institutions).
6. Moore, supra note 4, at 37 passim; Arkansas Gazette, January 28, 1989, at C2.
7. Vartanian & Schley, Bank Officer and Director Liability-Regulatory Actions, 39 Bus.
LAW. 1021 (1984).
8. The reported decisions found by this author, concerning directors' duties in the con-
text of depository institutions in Arkansas, all involve banks. Therefore, this article will refer
to bank directors. The point has been made that savings and loans are also "depository institu-
tions. " See supra note 1. Thus, these duties should also apply to directors of savings and loans
in Arkansas. See 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, § 3.2.6 (discussing the duties of directors of
depository institutions without distinguishing between banks and savings and loans).
9. E.g., First National Bank v. Rushton, 251 Ark. 74, 77, 472 S.W.2d 945, 946 (1971);
see also 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, §§ 3.1, 3.2.6, at 234 (noting some statutes); Vartanian &
Schley, supra note 7, at 1021 passim (discussing federal regulatory options and the underlying
statutes).
10. Some courts have held that the directors of federally chartered depository institutions
are subject to federal, not state, common law. E.g., Eureka Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kidwell,
672 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see also 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, § 3.1 (1988 & 2d
Cum. Supp. 1988). Other courts have mixed federal statutory law and state common law in
discussing directors' duties. E.g., Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385 (8th Cir. 1979) (applying
Arkansas' common law); see also 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, § 3.1.
The former line of authorities calls into question the relevance of state common law.
Even if federal common law is found to control, a federal court may adopt state common law
and apply it as federal law. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 60 (4th ed. 1983).
It is not clear whether the Lane court was incorporating Arkansas law as federal common law
or simply judging the actions of directors of a federally-chartered bank based on state common
law duties. In either instance, it appears that Arkansas common law is relevant in the Eighth
Circuit, regardless of whether the Arkansas depository institution has a federal charter.
11. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-907 (1987) (directors' liability for violation of loan
limitations).
12. E.g., Lane, 610 F.2d 1385; Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416, 435, 196
S.W. 803, 809 (1917); see 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, § 3.1. See also First National Bank v.
Rushton, 251 Ark. 74, 85, 472 S.W.2d 945, 951-52 (1971) (Fogleman, J., dissenting).
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duties imposed in Arkansas. More importantly, this article aspires to
place those duties into a meaningful context. By reviewing the factual
situations in which the courts have applied common law duties, this
article will illustrate the behavior necessary for a director to fulfill his
obligations, thereby avoiding liability under the common law.
II. WHO IS A DIRECTOR?
All banks, whether federally or state chartered, are managed and
controlled by a board of directors.13 For the time that they serve,
directors are subject to the common law duties discussed below.14 An
initial consideration involves determining the steps necessary to as-
sume the position of director and the steps necessary to terminate it.
A. Election and Acceptance
Directors are generally elected by the bank's shareholders. 5
However, an individual is not automatically subjected to a director's
duties simply because he was elected to that position. Only after ac-
cepting a position does a director become subject to liability for
breach of his duties.16
In Bank of Des Arc v. Moody, 7 the Arkansas Supreme Court
determined that certain directors were liable for breach of their com-
mon law duties. One alleged director, Vaughan, argued that he never
accepted a directorship, so he should not be held liable for the plain-
tiffs' damages.' 8 While there was proof that the bank's shareholders
had elected Vaughan as director, Vaughan testified to the contrary.
[H]e testified that he was not present at the meeting [at which he
was elected], and never received any notice or information that he
was elected a director, and never acted as such and had nothing to
do with the management of the bank until he was called in to assist
the cashier after the [bad] loans were made. 9
There was no contrary testimony on these points, so the supreme
court reversed the trial court's decree against Vaughan on the basis of
13. 12 U.S.C. § 71 (1982); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-224 (Supp. 1987); 10 AM. JUR. 2D
Banks § 178 (1963).
14. 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks § 195 (1963).
15. 12 U.S.C. § 71 (1982); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-224 (Supp. 1987).
16. Zimmerman v. Western & Southern Fire Ins. Co., 121 Ark. 408, 412, 181 S.W. 283,
285 (1915); Bank of Des Arc v. Moody, 110 Ark. 39, 42, 161 S.W. 134, 135 (1913).
17. 110 Ark. 39, 161 S.W. 134 (1913).




his liability as a director.2 °
This issue arose again in Zimmerman v. Western & Southern Fire
Insurance Co.2' Evidence supported the trial court's finding that a
bank's directors were liable for "gross mismanagement of the affairs
and business of the bank, causing considerable loss to the depositors
and stockholders. ' 22 In challenging the judgment, Zimmerman
claimed the protection of the statute of limitations; he argued that he
ceased to be a director at a point outside the statute. The Arkansas
Supreme Court agreed.23 The minutes of the shareholders' meetings
demonstrated that Zimmerman was elected director through the year
1909. However, testimony demonstrated that Zimmerman offered to
resign in March of 1906. The bank's president persuaded Zimmer-
man not to resign, on the promise that he would not be reelected di-
rector at the April 1906 meeting. Apparently, Zimmerman did not
attend the April meeting, and never knew of his subsequent reelection
until after the bank had been placed into receivership. 24 The court
stated the applicable rule as follows:
The minutes of the corporation were very loosely kept and were
unsigned, but, conceding that they were competent evidence tend-
ing to show the election of Zimmerman as a director, that testi-
mony is subject to be rebutted; and, in addition to that, in order to
hold Zimmerman liable, it is essential that he should have accepted
the appointment .... There must be an acceptance of the office of
director before any liability can flow from the failure to discharge
the duties of the office.2 5
The court held that the evidence was in Zimmerman's favor; determi-
native factors included Zimmerman's proposed resignation and his
prior refusal to serve after the April 1906 meeting. 26
A director's duties therefore arise only after an individual has
been elected director and has accepted that position. Election alone is
clearly not sufficient grounds to impose a director's duties on an indi-
vidual.27 Factors indicating acceptance include knowledge of the
election, either through attending the shareholders' meeting or other-
wise, exercising the duties of a director, and assistance in the manage-
20. Id. at 42-43, 161 S.W. at 136.
21. 121 Ark. 408, 181 S.W. 283 (1915).
22. Id. at 410, 181 S.W. at 284.
23. Id. at 410-11, 181 S.W. at 284-85.
24. Id. at 411-12, 181 S.W. at 284-85.
25. Id. at 412, 181 S.W. at 285.
26. Id. at 412-13, 181 S.W. at 285.
27. Id. at 412, 181 S.W. at 285.
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ment of the bank.28 Even if the minutes indicate that one was elected
director, they may be rebutted by demonstrating that the position was
never accepted.29
B. Resignation and Termination
A director's position could terminate through the natural expira-
tion of his term, his resignation, or his removal from the position for
regulatory or other reasons.30 An aggrieved party must then sue the
director within the applicable statute of limitations, or the statute will
bar recovery.3 Once the director steps down from his position, he is
not liable for subsequent mismanagement of the bank's affairs.32
Bank directors generally have the right to resign at any time; no
formal acceptance of their resignation is required.3 3 While in some
instances bank directors might avoid liability by resigning, circum-
stances may exist which indicate that the resignation itself is a breach
of duty.34 In those situations, liability may continue even though the
right to resign is absolute.3a
III. THE DIRECTOR'S DUTIES
A. Generally
It is easy enough to state the rules. A bank's affairs, like those of
other corporations, 36 are managed and controlled by a board of direc-
tors.37 Their fiduciary duties are owed to the bank's shareholders and
depositors 38 and are analogous to those duties owed by a trustee
under an implied trust.39 In exercising their duties, directors are held
to a standard of care which requires a constant exercise of good faith
28. Id. at 411-13, 181 S.W. at 284-85; Bank of Des Arc v. Moody, 110 Ark. 39, 42, 161
S.W. 134, 135 (1913).
29. Zimmerman, 121 Ark. at 412, 181 S.W. at 284-85.
30. 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, § 3.2.2.
31. Magale v. Fomby, 132 Ark. 289, 201 S.W. 278 (1918); 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks § 219
(1963).
32. 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks § 195 (1963).
33. Zimmerman, 121 Ark. at 412, 181 S.W. at 285; see generally Tuohey, Corporate Direc-
tor Resignation, 33 ARK. L. REV. 106, 117-20 (1979) (general discussion of this rule).
34. See Deal, Liability of Bank Directors, 39 Bus. LAW. 1033, 1034 (1984).
35. Id.; Tuohey, supra note 33, at 108-12.
36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-801 (Supp. 1987).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 71 (1982); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-224 (Supp. 1987); 1 M. MALLOY,
supra note 1, § 3.2.3.
38. Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385, 1388-89 (8th Cir. 1979).
39. Magale v. Fomby, 132 Ark. 289, 296-97, 201 S.W. 278, 280 (1918); Bank of Com-
merce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416, 435-36, 196 S.W. 803, 809 (1917).
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and diligence.4° This is not to say that directors are insurers of the
bank's officers' actions, 41 or that directors are liable for the mere exer-
cise of poor judgment.42 But directors must exercise constant dili-
gence and good faith,43 and when they fail to do so through negligent
attention to their duties, directors will be liable to shareholders and
depositors for losses resulting from that negligence."
A review of the cases is more instructive than a restatement of
the rules. How are these rules applied in practice? Given that there
are various aspects of bank management requiring a director's atten-
tion, how do these rules apply to those various matters?
B. The Duty to Give Attention to and Control the Bank's Affairs
1. Generally
Bank directors have a duty to exercise reasonable attention to
and control over their bank's affairs. 45 A model of the degree of at-
tention and control required, characterized by the Arkansas Supreme
Court as "the greatest diligence,"" is as follows:
The board of directors met regularly, not less than once each
month, and frequently oftener, at which time a typewritten copy of
a statement was given to each director showing all transactions
since the last meeting, including the paper still on hand and also
that acquired since the last previous meeting. The board had an
auditing committee which functioned regularly. The managing of-
ficers were shown to have acted pursuant to and in accordance
with resolutions duly passed by the board of directors, no loan was
made until it had been duly examined and approved by the officers
having that authority.4 7
Of course, the degree of attention and control may vary from instance
to instance, depending upon "the peculiar facts and circumstances of
each particular case.'"48
One case depicting directors at their best and worst is Ford v.
40. Sternberg v. Blaine, 179 Ark. 448, 452-53, 17 S.W.2d 286, 288 (1929); Goolsby, 129
Ark. at 435-39, 196 S.W. at 809-10; 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, § 3.2.6; 10 AM. JUR. 2D
Banks §§ 181-82 (1963).
41. Goolsby, 129 Ark. at 439, 196 S.W. at 810; 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks § 190 (1963).
42. Muller v. Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 169 Ark. 480, 486-87, 275 S.W. 750, 752
(1925); 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks § 183 (1963).
43. Sternberg, 179 Ark. at 452-53, 17 S.W.2d at 288.
44. Id.; 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, § 3.2.6; 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks § 181 (1963).
45. Goolsby, 129 Ark. at 437-38, 196 S.W. at 809-10.
46. Milburn v. Martin, 190 Ark. 16, 19-20, 76 S.W.2d 952, 954 (1934).
47. Id. at 20, 76 S.W.2d at 954.
48. Goolsby, 129 Ark. at 439, 196 S.W. at 810.
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Taylor.49 Prior to January of 1925, the directors of the Peoples' Bank
of Ozark had exhibited adequate attention to and control over the
bank's affairs. For instance, "they had met regularly, and had kept
their records properly, and had a discount committee which had func-
tioned, and the directors had made an audit of the bank's affairs in the
year 1924. " 50 While the directors may have demonstrated poor judg-
ment, that was not sufficient grounds for liability. The court reasoned
that shareholders assumed the risk of losses from "mere defects in
judgment" when they selected directors; the directors "merely as-
sum[ed] the obligation to manage the affairs of the institution with
diligence and good faith."
51
However, the Peoples' Bank of Ozark underwent an examination
by the state regulatory authorities in January of 1925. In the studied
words of the Arkansas Supreme Court, "it was a mere matter of in-
dulgence on the part of the examiner that the bank was permitted to
continue in business."52 The directors received a copy of the exam-
iner's report, which highlighted a variety of problems: the bank's
president had executed two notes to it and had indorsed one on his
brother's behalf; other officers and employees of the bank had taken
loans from it; there was a deficit in the bank's reserve; and "the prac-
tice of permitting overdrafts appeared to be habitual ....
Once the examination report placed the directors on notice of the
bank's problems, their duty of diligence and good faith in attending to
and controlling the bank's affairs "required them to give closer atten-
tion to the bank's affairs than they had previously done."54 The direc-
tors breached this duty. There was no audit of the bank's books made
during 1925; there was no effective loan review committee; directors
never examined the notes held by the bank; the directors skipped one
monthly meeting; "and no minutes of any meeting after September
[1925] were ever written up, or approved or signed by the board or its
officers." 55
The directors' negligence was particularly evident in their atten-
tion to the activities of the bank's cashier. Beginning in 1925, the
cashier did his best to contribute to the local economy. He purchased
80 acres within the city limits, built himself an expensive house, and
49. Ford v. Taylor, 176 Ark. 843, 4 S.W.2d 938 (1928).
50. Id. at 849, 4 S.W.2d at 940.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 848, 4 S.W.2d at 940.
53. Id. at 848-49, 4 S.W.2d at 940.
54. Id. at 849, 4 S.W.2d at 940.
55. Id. at 850-51, 4 S.W.2d at 941.
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built a "business house on one of the principal streets. '5 6 The cashier
speculated "in oil ventures; he operated a coal mine; he invested in a
diamond cave, and assisted in promoting a vineyard company and a
life insurance company. . .. "" The cashier financed these specula-
tions with loans from the bank, otherwise unauthorized.5"
The cashier's systematic course of conduct was so obvious to the
supreme court that "detection must have resulted from any reason-
able attempt at supervision. ' 59 A mere exercise of their duty to act in
good faith and with reasonable diligence would have enabled the di-
rectors to detect the cashier's activities.'
We do not hold that the directors were insurers of the honesty or
good faith of the cashier, or that they became liable for his fraudu-
lent conduct simply because they were directors, for such is not the
law as announced in the prior decisions of this court. But we do
hold them liable for their lack of diligence and good faith in super-
vising the affairs of the bank. Their inattention to the bank's affairs
furnished the cashier assurance that the boldest and most flagrant
conduct on his part would escape their detection and give the cash-
ier an opportunity to loot the bank systematically.
6
'
Based on the testimony, the Arkansas Supreme Court held the direc-
tors liable for losses incurred by the bank subsequent to January of
1925.62
Ford is a good illustration of the conduct required of bank direc-
tors. They must exercise good faith and diligence at all times.63 Fac-
tors indicating such attention and control include regular audits,
64
regular meetings as recorded by properly kept minutes, 65 attention to
the bank's officers' activities,66 and some degree of attention to the
lending and other operations of the bank.67 When directors are
placed on notice of potential problems, by examination reports or
otherwise, then their duty of good faith and diligence requires height-
56. Id. at 850, 4 S.W.2d at 940-41.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 852, 4 S.W.2d at 941.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 853, 4 S.W.2d at 942.
63. Id. at 847-48, 4 S.W.2d at 939-40; 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks §§ 181-82 (1963).
64. Ford, 176 Ark. at 849, 4 S.W.2d at 940-41.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 851-52, 4 S.W.2d at 941 (failure to monitor cashier one factor in sustaining
directors' liability).




ened attention to the bank's affairs.68
This latter point is illustrated by Sternberg v. Blaine.69 The Bank
of Blytheville's cashier and his assistant had, over a three year period,
stolen approximately $800,000 from the bank. Their activities re-
mained undiscovered by the bank's other officers and the bank exam-
iners over this period due to the extreme care with which they
doctored the bank's books.7" Other than this situation, no evidence of
the directors' negligence or mismanagement existed.7" A majority of
the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the bank's directors were not
liable for the losses.72
In the absence of any reason to suspect the honesty of the cashier,
there is no duty upon the directors to do more than is ordinarily
done by directors of a bank of this kind. A bank director is not
required to be an expert nor a competent bookkeeper, nor to do
more in the general management of the bank, with reference to its
cashier and bookkeeper, than to see that the statements made to
the board correspond to the books, unless there is some reason for
doubting the fidelity of the trust confided to the cashier or book-
keeper. Knowledge of all of the affairs of the bank cannot be im-
puted to a director for the purpose of charging him with liability,
unless there is something about the conduct of the cashier or book-
keeper or about the affairs of the bank that would arouse the suspi-
cion of a man of ordinary prudence.73
2. Factors Negating Liability: Poor Judgment
and Hard Times
Generally, courts will not hold bank directors liable for the exer-
cise of poor judgment.74 Such "poor judgment" is often found in the
context of an economic downturn, which renders the bank's assets
somewhat devalued.
In Muller v. Planters' Bank and Trust Co. ,7 shareholders of a
defunct bank sued its ex-directors for alleged negligent operation of
68. Id. at 849, 4 S.W.2d at 940.
69. Sternberg v. Blaine, 179 Ark. 448, 17 S.W.2d 286 (1929).
70. Id. at 450-51, 454-55, 457; 17 S.W.2d at 288-90.
71. Id. at 451, 17 S.W.2d at 288-89 (indicating regular meetings, review of notes, and
examinations by directors).
72. Id. at 458, 17 S.W.2d at 290.
73. Id. at 456-57, 17 S.W.2d at 290; see 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks §§ 190, 192 (1963).
74. Ford v. Taylor, 176 Ark. 843, 849, 4 S.W.2d 938, 940 (1928); Muller v. Planters' Bank
& Trust Co., 169 Ark. 480, 486-87, 275 S.W. 750, 752 (1925); 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks § 183
(1963).
75. 169 Ark. 480, 275 S.W. 750 (1925).
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the bank. The trial court found that the bank was prospering until
the summer of 1920. The economy then underwent a "depreciation in
values" which "progressed so rapidly that by the autumn of that year
there was a slump in values that caused heavy losses to all business
enterprises, especially to banking institutions which held collateral
from farmers and merchants. 76
The court found that the bank's losses resulted in part from poor
judgment in making loans, and in greater part from an economic
downturn, "for which no one connected with the institution was re-
sponsible. ' 77 The court then enunciated the applicable rule:
The substance, therefore, of the test laid down ... of the responsi-
bility of directors to stockholders as well as to creditors is good
faith and diligence. The mere exercise of poor judgment is not suf-
ficient to form a basis of liability, for when directors are selected by
the stockholders the latter assume the risk of losses occurring on
account of mere defects in judgment, and in acceptance of the of-
fice by the director he merely assumes the obligation to manage the
affairs of the institution with diligence and good faith.78
Here, the directors exercised such diligence and good faith, and the
court refused to hold them liable for poor economic conditions.79
A similar situation occurred in Ford v. Taylor."° The Peoples'
Bank of Ozark had suffered losses prior to January of 1925 due to bad
loans. However, "[m]ost of the loans then existing were renewals of
old loans made in more prosperous times and to persons who were
regarded as good when these loans were made."'" After an economic
slump, customers previously regarded as good credit risks were un-
able to meet their commitments. While the directors exercised poor
judgment in approving a number of these loans, the Arkansas
Supreme Court cited Muller in relieving the directors of liability for
these loans.8 2
It is important to note that the directors in Ford and Muller did
no more than exercise poor judgment. Had there been inattention on
their part, or some other breach of duty, the results may have been
different. But, poor judgment standing alone was not indicative of
negligence.
76. Id. at 481, 484, 275 S.W. at 751.
77. Id. at 485, 275 S.W. at 751.
78. Id. at 486-87, 275 S.W. at 752.
79. Id. at 487, 275 S.W. at 752.
80. Ford v. Taylor, 176 Ark. 843, 4 S.W.2d 938 (1928).
81. Id. at 849, 4 S.W.2d at 940.




One factor indicative of the directors' attention and control is the
practice of independently auditing the bank's books. 83 A directors'
audit tends to support a finding of good faith and diligence;84 the ab-
sence of independent audits can be some evidence of negligence.
The entire board need not conduct the audit. The bank's board of
directors could create an audit committee and appoint a subset of its
members to conduct an audit.86 The remaining directors may then
rely on the audit committee's findings, if they reasonably believe the
audit committee merits their confidence.87
4. Examiners' Reports
Bank regulators generally are required by law to examine a
bank's affairs on a regular basis and to report on their findings.88
When the examination reports bring problems to the attention of di-
rectors, they are required to give those problems closer attention. 89
The failure of bank examiners to detect a problem might work in
the directors' favor in an unintended manner. In Sternberg v.
Blaine,90 the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that bank examiners
failed to discover a bank's losses over the course of a three-year pe-
riod. There was no evidence that the bank examiners were negligent
in the performance of their duties. 91 Even if there had been such evi-
dence, "while a failure of the bank examiner to perform his duty did
not excuse the directors from the performance of their duties, . . . the
fact that [the bank] was examined regularly by the bank examiners is
a circumstance tending to show that the directors were not negligent
in the performance of their duties."'9 2 Thus, a bank examiner's failure
to discover wrongdoing may be some evidence of the absence of negli-
gence on the part of the bank's directors.
83. See Deal, supra note 34, at 1035 (noting the importance of an audit committee).
84. Ford, 176 Ark. at 849, 4 S.W.2d at 940.
85. Id. at 850, 851, 4 S.W.2d at 941.
86. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-825 (Supp. 1987); Deal, supra note 34, at 1035.
87. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-830.B.3 (Supp. 1987); Deal, supra note 34, at 1035-36.
88. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b) (1982); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-32-1103 (Supp. 1987); 10 AM.
JUR. 2D Banks § 18 (1963).
89. Ford, 176 Ark. at 849, 4 S.W.2d at 940; see Deal, supra note 34, at 1036.
90. 179 Ark. 448, 17 S.W.2d 286 (1929).




C. Duty to Select, Oversee, and Retain Competent Management
Typically, a board of directors will delegate some responsibility
for the day-to-day management of the bank to their executive of-
ficers.9 3 This delegation imposes additional duties on the directors. A
bank's directors must exercise due care in the selection, oversight, and
retention of the bank's executive officers.9 4
A leading Arkansas case on this point, and on directors' duties in
general, is Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby.95 Apparently, the directors
of the Bank of Commerce allowed their officers to run amuck. The
president and cashier of the bank issued a series of misleading finan-
cial statements depicting a healthier condition at the bank than actu-
ally existed; the directors were well aware of this practice. 96 The
cashier of the bank engaged in a financial arrangement with a pawn-
broker which "virtually put the bank in partnership with [the pawn-
broker] in the pawnbrokerage business." 97 As collateral for his loans,
the pawnbroker provided the cashier with notes which were usurious
on their face, and therefore void.98 Although the cashier had his own
financial problems, the directors permitted him to borrow $2,800 of
the bank's money "without questions and without security." 99
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the directors were liable
for the losses caused by the officers' conduct."° The court noted that
the relationship between bank directors and bank shareholders is
more analogous to the relationship between a trustee and his trust
beneficiary, as opposed to the relationship between an agent and his
principal."0 ' Bank directors must exercise ordinary care and diligence
in the performance of their duties. 10 2 The Arkansas Supreme Court
related this general standard of care to the directors' supervision of
their officers as follows:
93. 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, § 3.2.4; 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks § 190 (1963).
94. Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385, 1388 (8th Cir. 1979) (directors had a duty to inves-
tigate and remove misbehaving officers); Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416, 437,
196 S.W. 803, 809 (1917) (directors must exercise reasonable control and supervision over
banks' officers); Fletcher v. Eagle, 74 Ark. 585, 588, 86 S.W. 810, 811 (1905) (directors can't
abdicate their management duties to officers). See Annotation, Liability of Corporate Directors
for Negligence in Permitting Mismanagement or Defalcations by Officers or Employees, 25
A.L.R.3D 941 (1969).
95. 129 Ark. 416, 196 S.W. 803 (1917).
96. Id. at 426-27, 196 S.W. at 806.
97. Id. at 441, 196 S.W. at 811.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 442, 196 S.W. at 811.
100. Id. at 442-43, 196 S.W. at 811.
101. Id. at 435-36, 196 S.W. at 809.
102. Id. at 439, 196 S.W. at 810.
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It is their duty to use ordinary diligence in ascertaining the condi-
tion of [the bank's] business, and to exercise reasonable control and
supervision over its officers.... That which [the directors] ought,
by proper diligence, to have known as to the general course of busi-
ness in the bank, they may be presumed to have known, in any
contest between the corporation and those who are justified by the
circumstances in dealing with its officers upon the basis of that
course of business. 103
The court did not hold that the directors were "insurers of the fidelity
or capacity of the cashier or other agents to whom the business and
assets of the bank may be entrusted. . ... 10 The directors were
merely "required to exercise due care in [the officers'] selection and
proper supervision over their action." 105
In this instance, the directors were clearly liable for the actions of
the officers. The directors knew, or could have known, of the false
financial statements, the bad loans to the pawnbroker, and the cash-
ier's other misdealings.106 Indeed, the cashier "was encouraged in his
reckless handling of the bank's funds... by knowledge of the fact that
the directors were giving practically no attention to the matter of
loans. ....",'0' The directors knew or could have known of the officers'
gross negligence had they exercised ordinary care in the management
of the bank's affairs and business. 108 Since they did not, the directors
were held jointly and severally liable for the losses suffered by the
bank. 109
In contrast, the directors at the Planters' Bank knew how to
properly oversee the actions of the bank's cashier. "0 The directors
personally attended to the affairs of the bank and supervised the cash-
ier's work to some extent. When they learned of problems relating to
the cashier's actions, they immediately placed restrictions upon him.
They also promptly acted to recover upon the cashier's surety
bond.I'I These facts, and others, led the Arkansas Supreme Court to
absolve the directors of liability for the bank's subsequent losses." 2
103. Id. at 437-38, 196 S.W. at 810 (quoting Martin v. Webb, 110 U.S. 7, 15 (1884)).
104. Id. at 439, 196 S.W. at 810.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 439-43, 196 S.W. at 810-11.
107. Id. at 442, 196 S.W. at 811.
108. Id. at 442-43, 196 S.W. at 811.
109. Id.
110. Muller v. Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 169 Ark. 480, 484-85, 275 S.W. 750, 751-52
(1925).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 484-87, 275 S.W. at 752.
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The degree of supervision that directors should exercise over
bank officers depends upon the bank's particular circumstances. If
the directors have no notice of an officer's dereliction of duty, the
directors are not expected to take extraordinary precautions to guard
against the officer's misconduct. "3 Once they have notice of such der-
eliction, however, directors must give heightened attention to the mat-
ter and act promptly to resolve it." 4
These rules are illustrated by Lane v. Chowning,"5 an Eighth
Circuit opinion. When the directors of Union National Bank became
suspicious of the activities of two of its officers, they voted to remove
them from their positions. Subsequently, one of the officers was con-
victed for criminal activities in which he had engaged while managing
the bank. " 6 This ex-officer then sued the board of directors, claiming
they induced him to enter into the criminal activity. The Eighth Cir-
cuit first noted that bank directors owe their duties to the bank's de-
positors and shareholders, and not to the bank's officers. "7 Thus,
[t]he duty of the directors in this proceeding clearly was to remove
[the officers] from power. In fact, the failure to investigate and
remove these men could have resulted in personal liability for the
directors and officers." 18
Nor did the directors act out of questionable motives; "under the law
of Arkansas, the directors had an obligation to exercise reasonable
control over the affairs of the bank."' ' 9
In some instances, directors may not be liable for losses caused
by officers. Where directors could not reasonably be expected to dis-
cover an officer's concealed transactions, the directors are not liable
for subsequent losses. 120 On the other hand, where the officer's con-
duct is so systematic that it would be observed through the exercise of
due diligence, concealment is no defense to a director's liability.' 2'
D. Duty to Ensure Proper Lending Practices
Bank directors must devote some attention to their bank's lend-
113. Sternberg v. Blaine, 179 Ark. 448, 456-57, 17 S.W.2d 286, 290 (1929).
114. Ford v. Taylor, 176 Ark. 843, 4 S.W.2d 938 (1928).
115. 610 F.2d 1385 (8th Cir. 1979).
116. Id. at 1387.
117. Id. at 1388-89.
118. Id. at 1389.
119. Id. at 1390.
120. Sternberg v. Blaine, 179 Ark. 448, 17 S.W.2d 286 (1929).
121. Ford v. Taylor, 176 Ark. 843, 851-52, 4 S.W.2d 938, 941 (1928).
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ing practices and policies. 22 When directors do not adequately man-
age the lending practices of the bank's officers, they may be held liable
for failure to control those practices. 123 On the other hand, if loan
losses result from poor judgment or an economic down turn, courts
will generally not hold directors liable. 24
Magale v. Fomby '25 presents an example of how not to conduct
commercial lending. Several directors and officers of the Columbia
County Bank organized a canning factory, which subsequently did
business with the bank. The canning company was never very suc-
cessful. From the time of its inception in early 1909 until December
15, 1911, the canning company borrowed $29,421.04 from the
bank. 126 Until late in 1911, all the bank had to show for its loans was
"notes... , overdrafts and accounts;" at that time, the bank took a
mortgage for the entire amount of the debt. 127 The bank later charged
off $16,000 worth of the debt, and the stockholders of the bank even-
tually made up the balance. 128
The Arkansas Supreme Court found that the bank's directors
"were guilty of such reckless conduct in the management of the affairs
of the bank as to constitute negligence .... 1,129 This finding was
based upon the bank's relationship with the canning company. The
bank's directors were not guilty of fraud in making the loans to the
canning factory, but other factors of the transaction seemed to trouble
the court: the bank took no security for its loans until after it ceased
to make them to the canning company; the bank allowed the canning
company to become indebted to the bank in an amount approximat-
ing three-fifths of the bank's capital stock; and the directors did not
adequately assess the canning company's chance of success.' 3 °
[T]hey believed the business would be successful. It is not shown,
however, that any of them had any experience in operating a can-
ning factory. It turned out to be a hazardous business and one that
required skill and experience on the part of those managing it in
order to make it a success.' 3 '
The directors were not held liable for the bank's losses, however, since
122. 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, § 3.2.6; 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks § 193 (1963).
123. E.g., Bank of Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416, 196 S.W. 803 (1917).
124. E.g., Muller v. Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 169 Ark. 480, 275 S.W. 750 (1925).
125. 132 Ark. 289, 201 S.W. 278 (1918).
126. Id. at 291-92, 201 S.W. at 278.
127. Id. at 292, 201 S.W. at 278-79.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 296, 201 S.W. at 280.
130. Id. at 295-96, 201 S.W. at 280.
131. Id. at 295, 201 S.W. at 280.
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the applicable statute of limitations had run.13 2
Magale and Goolsby support the proposition that directors
should apprise themselves of the nature and condition of the bank's
larger commercial borrowers. 133 Other aspects of the bank's lending
policy may also demand the directors' attention. These include
whether security should be taken for loans, 134 and the amount which
any one particular borrower will be permitted to draw. 35 Further,
directors should make some provision for reviewing their institution's
loans. 36
IV. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY UNDER THE NEW BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT
Directors of banks governed by the Business Corporation Act of
1987 37 may have their common law liability limited. Under the Act,
a corporation may include a provision in its Articles of Incorporation
limiting the personal liability of its directors to the corporation or its
stockholders for any breach of their fiduciary duty. 38 However, di-
rectors are still liable for a breach of their duty of loyalty, acts not
taken in good faith, intentional misconduct, knowing violations of the
law, unlawful distributions, improper personal benefit, and any breach
creating liability to a third party. 39
How would the adoption of such a provision affect a banking
corporation's directors? The common law duties discussed above
generally result in liability for directors if there is a finding of negli-
gent conduct.' 4° However, one part of the new Act requires more
culpable conduct; directors are liable only "for acts or omissions not
in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law ..... , Does this make it more difficult to establish a
132. Id. at 298, 201 S.W. at 280-81.
133. See Magale v. Fomby, 132 Ark. 289, 295-96, 201 S.W. 278, 279-80 (1918); Bank of
Commerce v. Goolsby, 129 Ark. 416, 441-42, 196 S.W. 803, 810-11 (1917).
134. See Magale, 132 Ark. at 295, 201 S.W. at 279-80 (noting a failure to secure loans).
135. See id. (noting significance of one borrower's debt).
136. See Goolsby, 129 Ark. at 430, 196 S.W. at 807 ("Generally two or three members of
the board of directors ought to be in the bank and discuss with the cashier the loans."); 10 AM.
JUR. 2D Banks § 193 (1963).
137. Act of April 14, 1987, No. 958, 1987 Ark. Acts 3096 (Adv. Leg. Serv.) (codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-27-101 to -1706 (Supp. 1987)). For a survey of the Act, see Brewer, An
Overview of the 1987 Arkansas Business Corporation Act, 10 UALR L.J. 431 (1987-88).
138. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202.B.3 (Supp. 1987); Brewer, supra note 137, at 436.
139. Id.
140. Eg., Sternberg v. Blaine, 179 Ark. 448, 453, 17 S.W.2d 286, 288 (1929); see 10 AM.
JUR. 2D Banks § 181 (1963).
141. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202.B.3(ii) (Supp. 1987).
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breach of the common law duties discussed above?
Perhaps not. One Arkansas case involved the liability of bank
directors under an "intentional negligence" standard, which is com-
parable to the higher standard allowed by the new Act., 42 Bailey v.
O'Neal 143 concerned an action brought by depositors against the di-
rectors of a bank. At that time, the statutes relating to corporations
in Arkansas required that the directors "intentionally neglect or re-
fuse to comply with the provisions" of the statutes before joint and
several liability would be imposed." Thus, the bank directors were
liable under the statute only if they acted intentionally. This statute is
analogous to the new Act's provision limiting liability to acts "not in
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct. .... "I4 The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court considered the liability of the bank's directors
under this statute, and did not apply the common law standard of
simple negligence. 146
[The statutes] do not make the directors liable for a single act of
negligence, however inconsequential; but they make them liable for
a series of connected acts of negligence continued for such a length
of time as it must be inferred that their acts of negligence were
intentional. 147
The facts of Bailey were as follows. The bank was organized in
1899. Almost from the time it commenced business, its chief
borrower was Kelley, or one of the corporations under his control. ,48
By the time the bank was placed into a receivership in April of 1906,
Kelley's indebtedness to the bank was so great that the Arkansas
Supreme Court summarized the situation as follows: "Liabilities
$241,684.00; assets, $324,154.44; Kelley indebtedness
$174,646.94."' 149
The only security for Kelley's loans ever received by the bank
was stock in his various corporations. Despite this lack of security,
the directors continued to allow the cashier to make loans to
Kelley. 0
Here we have the anomalous condition of directors, whose duty it
142. Compare id. with Bailey v. O'Neal, 92 Ark. 327, 329-30, 122 S.W. 503 (1909).
143. 92 Ark. 327, 122 S.W. 503 (1909).
144. Id. at 329-30, 122 S.W. at 504 (quoting KIRBY'S DIG. § 863 (1904)).
145. Compare id. with ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202.B.3(ii) (Supp. 1987).
146. Bailey, 92 Ark. at 331, 122 S.W. at 504.
147. Id. at 332, 122 S.W. at 505.
148. Id. at 332-33, 122 S.W. at 505.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 333-34, 122 S.W. at 505.
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was to manage the affairs of the bank, allowing the cashier to lend
to one man in his various enterprises, without security, sums of
money largely in excess of the capital stock of the bank, and to
continue that course of dealing for a period of several years.
The inevitable result of such management of the affairs of the bank
was the insolvency of the bank and of [Kelley's corporations].
Reasonable minds could come to no other conclusion, and the de-
fendants must be presumed to have intended the natural and prob-
able consequences of such acts of negligence on their part which
continued for a period of several years, and to have assented to the
negligent acts of the cashier.' 51
The directors were thus found to have acted with intentional neglect,
so that they were liable under the contemporary corporation
statutes. 1
5 2
Based on Bailey, an argument might be made that directors
would be liable for extended disregard for the common law duties
discussed above. If the bank directors negligently breached their du-
ties for a sufficient period of time, a court might consider their breach
intentional. 5 3 Thus, while the limitation of liability provision in the
new Act might protect bank directors from occasional breaches,5 4 a
course of negligent conduct resulting in continued violation of the
common law duties could result in personal liability to the corpora-
tion or its stockholders.'55
V. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
A. The Directors' Minutes
Minutes generally provide some evidence of the actions taken by
directors at their meetings, even if the minutes are imperfectly kept. 156
However, the minutes are not conclusive. Directors may rebut the
effect of the minutes by their own testimony."'
The Arkansas Supreme Court considered the evidentiary effect of
151. Id. at 334, 122 S.W. at 505.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Compare id. at 332, 122 S.W. at 504-05 with ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202.B.3(ii)
(Supp. 1987).
155. Compare Bailey, 92 Ark. at 332-34, 122 S.W. at 504-05 with ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-
202.B.3(ii) (Supp. 1987).
156. Grand National Bank of St. Louis v. Taylor, 176 Ark. 1, 6-7, 1 S.W.2d 818, 821
(1928).




minutes in Grand National Bank of St. Louis v. Taylor.'58 The Grand
National Bank sued the receiver of the Peoples' Bank of Ozark, in
connection with illicit transactions conducted by the latter's cashier.
The cashier claimed to act under the authority of a resolution passed
by the Ozark bank's directors. The resolution was found attached to
a page in the board's minute book.'59 In finding that the resolution
"was the genuine action of the board," the court stated the following
rules:
The minute book of a corporation, when identified, is competent
evidence as to all recitals contained therein, and, even though un-
signed, the minutes may be used to prove what took place at the
meeting, and that a resolution was passed thereat.' 6 °
The validity of the resolution was supported by the minutes of the
subsequent meeting. They showed that the minutes of the previous
meeting "were read and approved," thereby supporting a finding that
the board actually passed the resolution.' 6'
On the other hand, a bank's minutes can be rebutted. Thus, even
if the minutes indicate that an individual was elected director, their
effect may be rebutted by testimony showing that the individual never
accepted the position. 6 2 And, where the minutes of the banks' board
indicate that it did not meet as regularly as it perhaps should have,
"[t]he minutes of the directors' meetings were not conclusive as to the
extent of the attention given by the directors to the business of the
institution."' 63 Even though directors may subsequently have the op-
portunity to rebut the minutes, they should still take care to see that
they are accurately kept when they are made. 6'
B. Statute of Limitations
Section 16-56-105(3) of the Arkansas Code provides that "all ac-
tions founded on any contract or liability, expressed or implied" shall
be brought within three years after the cause of action accrues. 65
Based on the holding of Magale v. Fomby, this three-year statute of
limitations ought to apply to a bank director's breach of his common
158. 176 Ark. 1, 1 S.W.2d 818 (1928).
159. Id. at 5-6, 1 S.W.2d at 820.
160. Id. at 7, 1 S.W.2d at 821.
161. Id.
162. Zimmerman, 121 Ark. at 412, 181 S.W. at 284-85.
163. Muller v. Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 169 Ark. 480, 483-84, 275 S.W. 750, 751
(1925).
164. See Deal, supra note 34, at 1037.




In Magale,167 a stockholder brought an action against the direc-
tors and officers of a bank. After finding'that the directors and of-
ficers "were guilty of such reckless conduct in the management of the
affairs of the bank as to constitute negligence,"'168 the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations barred the ac-
tion. 169 The court noted that:
[t]he defendants rely on the statute of limitations of three years to
defeat the action. Section 5064 of Kirby's Digest provides that all
actions founded upon any contract or liability, expressed or im-
plied, in writing, shall be commenced within three years after the
cause of action shall accrue.' 7 o
The court observed that under Arkansas law, the directors of banks
"are trustees of an implied trust and are within the protection of the
statute."171
In other words "while there is no expressed declaration of trust,
[the directors'] liability in cases of this sort is implied from their offi-
cial relation to the bank and there is an implied or resulting trust
created by operation of law when they become directors of the
bank."' 7 2 Here, the plaintiff had known of the directors' activities for
over three years. There was "no fraudulent concealment of their acts
by the directors that would [otherwise toll] the operation of the stat-
ute of limitations."'7 3 "No acts of negligence on the part of the direc-
tors occurred within three years before the bringing of the action and
their liability implied from their relation to the bank is barred by the
statute of limitations."'' 74
VI. CONCLUSION
This article plowed no new ground in discussing the common
law duties of bank directors in Arkansas. However, given the concern
over the health of depository institutions in general, and the resulting
attention to directors and their duties, it is hoped that this survey will
166. Compare id. with Magale v. Fomby, 132 Ark. 289, 296-98, 201 S.W. 278, 280-81
(1918).
167. 132 Ark. 289, 201 S.W. 278 (1918).
168. Id. at 296, 201 S.W. at 280.
169. Id. at 298, 201 S.W. at 281.
170. Id. at 296, 201 S.W. at 280.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 297, 201 S.W. at 280.
174. Id. at 298, 201 S.W. at 280.81.
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help bank directors avoid future losses and liability under the com-
mon law of Arkansas.
It is true that, in recent years, federal statutes and regulations
have eclipsed the common law in imposing duties and liabilities upon
bank directors.175 However, a study of the common law would benefit
more than a director's knowledge of legal history. Many of the state
and federal statutory and regulatory duties are a codification or ex-
pansion of bank directors' common law duties. 176 To the extent that
an understanding of their common law duties will help directors to
understand the basis for their statutory duties, a study of the common
law might assist directors in performing their duties and avoiding lia-
bility for any losses their institution might incur.
175. 1 M. MALLOY, supra note 1, §§ 3.1, 3.2.6.
176. See D. Melvin, The Thirty Minute Bank Holding Company Director, pp. 5-1, 6-1,
(Association of Bank Holdings Companies 1985 ); Cf Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385, 1390
(8th Cir. 1979) (where directors removed two officers, the 8th Circuit found authority for their
action in a federal statute and the common law of Arkansas).
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